

**Syllabus**

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**Texts:** The main textbooks are Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, *Microeconomic Theory*; Osborne and Rubinstein, *A Course in Game Theory*; and Fudenberg and Tirole, *Game Theory*. Other readings will be posted to the course website

**Lecture Notes:** Lecture notes will ordinarily be posted after each lecture.

**Readings:** References to the relevant readings will be posted after each lecture.

**Homework:** There will be four problem sets, which will be graded on a check-/check/check+ basis. Problem set grades will count in cases where you would otherwise be on the borderline between two grades.

**Sections:** Thursdays 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm (M-16) and Fridays 10:00 am to 11:30 am (M-15).

**Topics** (provisional):

1. Extensive and normal forms; information sets; strategies mixed strategies, and behavioral strategy; games of imperfect recall
2. Nash equilibrium and extensions (minimax, correlated, strong, and collusion-proof equilibrium)
3. Dominance, iterated dominance, rationalizability
4. Nash implementation
5. Incomplete information and Bayesian equilibrium
6. Auctions
7. Dynamic games of complete information; subgame perfect and Markov equilibrium
8. Bargaining
9. Repeated games
10. Dynamic games of incomplete information; perfect Bayesian, sequential, trembling-hand perfect, and proper equilibrium
11. Signaling, forward induction