## Working Papers

**Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News** (with Jetlir Duraj)

[abstract] [download pdf] [online appendix] [slides] [arXiv]

**Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks** (with Krishna Dasaratha)

[abstract] [download pdf] [slides] [twitch.tv VOD] [arXiv]

*aggregative efficiency*”) and hence the speed of social learning depend on the extent of

*informational confounding*in the network. Agents who do not observe all predecessors optimally discount neighbors’ behavior to avoid over-counting early movers’ confounding actions. We show how to compute every agent’s accuracy on any network. When agents move in generations and observe some members of the previous generation in a symmetric manner, we derive an exact expression for aggregative efficiency as a function of the network parameters. Each generation aggregates fewer than two extra signals in the long run, even when generations are arbitrarily large. When agents observe all predecessors from the previous generation, no more than three signals are aggregated per generation starting from the third generation, and larger generations lead to a slower learning rate.

**Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler’s Fallacy in Optimal-Stopping
Problems**

[abstract] [download pdf] [online
appendix] [arXiv]

**An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning** (with Krishna Dasaratha)

Revision requested at *Games and Economic Behavior*. Presented at *EC’20*.

[abstract] [download pdf] [slides] [pre-registration] [EC’20 talk] [arXiv]

**Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium** (with Drew Fudenberg)

Revision requested at *Journal of Economic Theory*.

[abstract] [download
pdf] [arXiv]

*Player-Compatible Equilibrium*(PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players’ “trembles” onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite. We show that rational learning and weighted fictitious play imply our compatibility restrictions in a steady-state setting.

## Published Papers

**Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning** (with Krishna Dasaratha)

*Theoretical Economics* 15(2):415–444, May 2020.

[abstract] [download pdf]
[publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

**Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games** (with Drew Fudenberg)

*Games and Economic Behavior* 120:96-120, March 2020.

[abstract] [download
pdf] [publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

*rationality-compatible equilibria*(

*RCE*), and bounded below by

*uniform RCE*. RCE refine the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and include all divine equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1987). Uniform RCE sometimes but not always exists, and implies universally divine equilibrium.

**Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games** (with Drew Fudenberg)

*Econometrica* 86(4):1215-1255, July 2018.

[abstract] [download
pdf] [online appendix] [publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

**Bayesian Posteriors for Arbitrarily Rare Events** (with Drew Fudenberg and Lorens Imhof)

*Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114(19):4925-4929, May 2017.

[abstract] [download pdf] [publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

**Differentially Private and Incentive Compatible Recommendation System for the
Adoption of Network Goods** (with Xiaosheng
Mu)

*Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
(EC’14)*:949-966, June 2014.

[abstract] [download pdf] [slides]
[publisher’s DOI]

## Current Classes

I'm not teaching in 2020.

In Spring 2021, I will teach an introductory game theory class for graduate students in SAS/SEAS/Wharton (ECON 682) and an advanced topics class for second- and third-year Ph.D. students in Economics (ECON 712).

## Past Classes

**Intermediate Microeconomics - Advanced** (ECON 1011A, as TA)

This course teaches the basic tools of economics and their applications to a wide range of human
behavior.

[syllabus] [section notes] [teaching evaluations]

**Economic Theory** (ECON 2010A, as TA)

Topics include extensive- and normal-form games, Nash equilibrium, rationalizability, Nash
implementation, auctions, bargaining, repeated games, signaling, and forward induction.

[syllabus] [section notes] [teaching evaluations]