## Working Papers

**Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications** (with Jonathan Libgober)

[abstract] [download pdf] [arXiv]

*evolutionarily stable*against another if, whenever sufficiently prevalent, its adherents obtain higher expected objective payoffs than their counterparts. The learning channel leads to novel stability phenomena compared to frameworks where the heritable unit of cultural transmission is a single belief instead of a specification (i.e., set of feasible beliefs). We apply the framework to linear-quadratic-normal games where players receive correlated signals but possibly misperceive the information structure. The correct specification is not evolutionarily stable against a correlational error, whose direction depends on matching assortativity.

**Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks** (with Krishna Dasaratha)

[abstract] [download pdf] [slides] [twitch.tv VOD] [arXiv]

*aggregative efficiency*of social learning across networks. Learning is very inefficient in a class of networks where agents move in generations and observe the previous generation. Generations after the first contribute very little additional information, even when generations are arbitrarily large.

**Dynamic Information Design with Diminishing Sensitivity Over News** (with Jetlir Duraj)

[abstract] [download pdf] [online appendix] [slides] [arXiv]

**Mislearning from Censored Data: The Gambler’s Fallacy in Optimal-Stopping
Problems**

Revision requested at *Theoretical Economics*.

[abstract] [download pdf] [online
appendix] [arXiv]

**An Experiment on Network Density and Sequential Learning** (with Krishna Dasaratha)

Revised and resubmitted to *Games and Economic Behavior*. Presented at *EC’20*.

[abstract] [download pdf] [slides] [pre-registration] [EC’20 talk] [arXiv]

**Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium** (with Drew Fudenberg)

Revised and resubmitted to *Journal of Economic Theory*.

[abstract] [download
pdf] [arXiv]

*Player-Compatible Equilibrium*(PCE) imposes cross-player restrictions on the magnitudes of the players’ “trembles” onto different strategies. These restrictions capture the idea that trembles correspond to deliberate experiments by agents who are unsure of the prevailing distribution of play. PCE selects intuitive equilibria in a number of examples where trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) have no bite. We show that rational learning and weighted fictitious play imply our compatibility restrictions in a steady-state setting.

## Published Papers

**Network Structure and Naive Sequential Learning** (with Krishna Dasaratha)

*Theoretical Economics* 15(2):415–444, May 2020.

[abstract] [download pdf]
[publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

**Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games** (with Drew Fudenberg)

*Games and Economic Behavior* 120:96-120, March 2020.

[abstract] [download
pdf] [publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

*rationality-compatible equilibria*(

*RCE*), and bounded below by

*uniform RCE*. RCE refine the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and include all divine equilibria (Banks and Sobel, 1987). Uniform RCE sometimes but not always exists, and implies universally divine equilibrium.

**Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games** (with Drew Fudenberg)

*Econometrica* 86(4):1215-1255, July 2018.

[abstract] [download
pdf] [online appendix] [publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

**Bayesian Posteriors for Arbitrarily Rare Events** (with Drew Fudenberg and Lorens Imhof)

*Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114(19):4925-4929, May 2017.

[abstract] [download pdf] [publisher’s DOI] [arXiv]

**Differentially Private and Incentive Compatible Recommendation System for the
Adoption of Network Goods** (with Xiaosheng
Mu)

*Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
(EC’14)*:949-966, June 2014.

[abstract] [download pdf] [slides]
[publisher’s DOI]

## Current Classes

**Game Theory and Applications** (ECON 682)

An introduction to game theory aimed at graduate students in SAS/SEAS/Wharton.

[syllabus] [canvas]

**Topics in Advanced Economic Theory and Mathematical Economics** (ECON 712)

A topics class for Ph.D. students in Economics, featuring a few of my favorite things: learning in games, learning in networks, and learning with psychological agents.

[syllabus] [canvas]

## Past Classes

**Intermediate Microeconomics - Advanced** (ECON 1011A, as TA)

This course teaches the basic tools of economics and their applications to a wide range of human
behavior.

[syllabus] [section notes] [teaching evaluations]

**Economic Theory** (ECON 2010A, as TA)

Topics include extensive- and normal-form games, Nash equilibrium, rationalizability, Nash
implementation, auctions, bargaining, repeated games, signaling, and forward induction.

[syllabus] [section notes] [teaching evaluations]